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Realist Nonideal Theory:  
The Intuition Critique, Reflective Equilibrium and the Role of Morality in Politics 
 
A. Introduction 
A common complaint about contemporary political philosophy is the apparent 
ineffectuality these theories have on the real world. Ideal theorizing, which is the most prominent 
methodology present in contemporary political philosophy, seeks to provide a measure by which 
to judge existing political structures and to approximate a goal to which theorists should be 
working toward. These efforts are rendered useless when we are made aware of any flaws in our 
depiction of the ideal society. Either through ignorance or methodological sloppiness, we fail to 
make real progress toward justice. This paper is an attempt to lay the foundations for a 
methodology of political philosophy that avoids this form of impotency. By pulling concepts 
from two competing conceptions of political theorizing, a hybrid methodology called “realist 
nonideal theory” shows promise in avoiding the pitfalls of both camps while co-opting their most 
desirable traits.  
This paper’s primary focus is to explain a major critique of the most popular morally 
concerned political methodology where in the end offering a promising alternative. In section 1, I 
explain Raymond Geuss’ intuition critique, alongside a critique leveled against John Rawls by 
nonideal theorist Charles W. Mills. I, then, in section 2, explain Rawls’ notion of reflective 
equilibrium. I define the limits and the internal dynamics of reflective equilibrium in order to later 
demonstrate the distinctions existing between current forms of political philosophy. Finally, in 
section 3, I explain the various forms of political philosophy and their problems using terms 
developed in section 2. In the end, I provide the foundations for realist nonideal theory; a form of 
political theory I believe avoids the intuition critique while also providing the morally concerned 
political theorist an option for shaping politics. 
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B. Section 1:  “The Intuition Critique and the Status Quo” 
a. Rawls 
Justice as fairness changed the landscape of contemporary political philosophy. The 
novel introduction of the original position allowed moral and political philosophers to temporarily 
put aside the exigencies of our imperfect world and get at what we mean by “justice”. Rawls’ 
contribution is nothing short of transformative to the field.1 But, despite the seminal role Rawls’ 
A Theory of Justice2 has had on political philosophy, it has its flaws. The visibility of Rawls’ 
justice as fairness makes it the primary target of many theorists, especially those unsatisfied with 
the apparent ineffectuality of ideal theories in political philosophy. I will outline these critiques 
which I believe constitute a serious challenge to Rawls’ theory and his approach (ideal 
theorizing). 
Nonideal theorists are, according to Rawls, the necessary theorists who will bring the 
world closer to justice as fairness. They are not necessarily committed to Rawls’ depiction of the 
ideally just society, rather, they take any ideally just society and provide prescriptions to reach 
this goal. They are primarily concerned with the current state of the real world; rather than 
dealing purely with the moral ideal, these theorists account for current injustices, limitations of 
governmental action and the degree to which the ideal could be realized in our world. With the 
introduction of these real world facts, nonideal theorists can develop prescriptions concerning 
which steps will bring the world into compliance with the demands of the ideal. Although this 
purely transitional view of nonideal theory limits the importance of real world facts on the ideal, 
not every nonideal theorist is content with this diminished role. 
Some nonideal theorists, for example, argue that Rawls fails to address the role his 
framing of the problem of distributive justice as one between heads of households has on the 
                                               
1 I would be remiss if I did not mention the effect it has had on my own interest in political philosophy. 
2 Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999. 
Print. 
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injustice perpetrated against women. And, his relegating of gender and racial identity as 
inadmissible behind the veil of ignorance has the effect of minimizing the relative importance of 
non-distributive forms of justice. But the most important nonideal critique, for our purposes, is 
one put forward by Mills. 
 
b. Mills 
Charles W. Mills, in his article “Ideal Theory” as Ideology3, offers a critique of ideal 
theory that centers around its use of idealizations. He provides two senses in which the term ideal 
is used. The first sense in which ideal is used is referred to as ideal-as-descriptive-model which is 
a model of how the world actually works. Of course, in order for a theory to get off the ground it 
must abstract away from some of the features present in the actual world. This descriptive model 
is attempting to capture how the world actually works and its essential nature. This first type of 
model is equated to the activity of nonideal theorizing. The second sense of ideal is referred to as 
ideal-as-idealized-model which is a model that serves as an exemplar. This model is how the 
world should work as opposed to simply describing how it does work.4 This type of model is 
what Mills is charging ideal theory of providing. Essentially, there is a model that provides a 
descriptive account of the world and another that provides a normative account. 
 Mills charges ideal theory with focusing only on the normative ideal-as-idealized-model. 
The problem with this misdirected focus, according to Mills, is that it provides little guidance in 
actually achieving the ideal. According to ideal theorists, the actual world is merely a deviation 
from the ideal. The best means of proceeding is by developing from the ideal world and making 
the actual world reflect it. But if the ideal is vastly different from the current state of affairs, 
questions concerning how to effectively move toward it could abound to the point where paralysis 
sets in.  
                                               
3 Mills, Charles W. (Charles Wade). ""Ideal Theory" as Ideology."Hypatia 20.3 (2005): 165-84. Print. 
4 Ibid, pp. 166-7 
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 Ideal theorists must also make various assumptions in order to develop their picture of the 
ideal world.5 What is most important is that it be made clear that the starting point for ideal 
theories are ideal conceptions of the world, not the actual world. These idealized concepts 
constitute blind spots for an ideal theory. If a theory takes, for instance, ideal social institutions as 
a given when constructing an account of justice, then the theory cannot properly speak of 
instances of discrimination within an institution. All that a theory of this nature can say is that it is 
morally wrong to discriminate. Furthermore, who defines these concepts? How is an ideal social 
institution structured? What are the ideal capacities of citizens? What is the preferred social 
ontology? All these questions are left unexamined. Since idealized concepts play a foundational 
role to ideal theories, then an ideal theory will implicitly endorse certain uncritical interpretations 
of these idealized concepts.  
 Mills argues that the utilization of idealized concepts is how ideal theory becomes 
ideology. These idealized assumptions are made with “no good reasons” and with “many reasons 
against” them. Mills states, 
Ideal Theory, I would contend, is really an ideology, a distortional complex of ideas, 
values, norms, and beliefs that reflects the nonrepresentative interests and experiences of 
a small minority of the national population--middle-to-upper-class white males--who are 
hugely over-represented in the professional philosophical population.6 
Mills’ main contention with the use of idealizations is that it perpetuates the ideology of the 
dominant group and, thus, perpetuates domination by that group. Ultimately, Rawls’ use of these 
idealizations has the effect of perpetuating injustice. Although the explicit intent of ideal theories 
may be to provide a means of reducing injustice, it may actually perpetuate it. This argument is 
                                               
5 Mills lists and develops these at length; they include the following: an idealized social ontology, idealized 
capacities, silence on oppression, ideal social institutions, an idealized cognitive sphere, and strict 
compliance. We need not delve into each of these for our purposes. 
6 Ibid, p. 172 
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Raymond Geuss is a political realist who provides, similar to Mills, a critique of 
Rawlsian ideal theory. Geuss, in his book Philosophy and Real Politics7, claims that the 
production and proliferation of a theory of politics is a political act, in itself. Political theorists are 
not merely developing ideas from an armchair which may be interesting or inspiring to some 
politically concerned individuals. They are engaging in politics: political theorists are political 
actors. Geuss argues that the primary target of political theorists are the currently held beliefs 
about politics in a given society. Rawls believes he is talking about such beliefs; he believes he is 
explaining what we mean by justice and what our intuitions surrounding this moral concept have 
to say about the proper political arrangement. Inescapably, the moral theorist, when politics is the 
focus, is dealing in ideology; they are dealing with our various beliefs and attitudes concerning 
politics. Geuss’ definition of ideology, 
An ideology, then, is a set of beliefs, attitudes, preferences that are distorted as a result of 
the operation of specific relations of power; the distortion will characteristically take the 
form of presenting these beliefs, desires, etc., as inherently connect with some universal 
interest, when in fact they are subservient to particular interests.8 
A political act addresses the prevailing ideology in one of two ways. On one hand, a theory can 
either attack the prevailing ideology. It can provide critiques about wrongly held assumptions 
which the ideology contains and perpetuates. On the other, it can affirm the prevailing ideology. 
There are two ways affirmation occurs. First, a political act can directly approbate an ideology. 
By providing theoretical support to commonly held beliefs, a political philosophy can provide 
                                               
7 Geuss, Raymond. Philosophy and Real Politics. N.p.: Princeton UP, 2008. Print. 
8 Ibid, p. 52 
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further justification for an ideology and encourage its adoption. Second, a political act can 
obfuscate the fact that an ideology is present. By focusing the conversation on a topic that does 
not address ideology or its influence, a political act can endorse an ideology by distracting away 
from its existence.9 Geuss charges Rawls with the latter.  
 In particular, Geuss takes exception to the fact that Rawls does not address the effect of 
differential power on the formation of “our” intuitions. Differential power is expressed when a 
certain ideology holds a privileged position within a society. This privileged position, generally, 
has the effect of rendering its assumptions as factual, natural or self-evident. So, when Rawls 
does not address this fact when relying on “our” intuitions about justice, he is implicitly affirming 
the prevailing ideology. [This point parallels Mill’s ideology critique of Rawls.] “Rawls’s work 
was an attempt to reconcile Americans to an idealized version of their own social order at the end 
of the twentieth century”.10 I refer to this line of criticism as Geuss’ ‘intuition critique’. This 
critique can be broadened to any ideal theory that fails to properly account for ideological 
influences on one’s intuitions. 
 
d. Contrast 
What should be clear from these two critiques is the fact that serious concerns can be 
raised about the methodology of ideal theory. This section has illuminated a major problem 
within ideal theory and made clear how both the nonideal theorist and the political realist 
articulate the problem. This apparent overlap of critique may contribute to the mistaken belief 
that realism and nonideal theory are synonymous. This view is mistaken, but I see this apparent 
overlap as evidence of the intuitive appeal of a hybrid theory situated between the two. It would 
be a misunderstanding to assume that a realist nonideal theory rests upon this similarity in 
                                               
9 Ibid, p. 53 
10 Ibid, p. 89 
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critique; the motivation behind my development of this hybrid approach is not necessarily the 
same motivation a political theorist will have for adopting this approach.11 
The difference between these critiques rests upon why each theorist thinks Rawls fails. 
Mills, on one hand, is concerned with the perpetuation of injustice as the primary wrong 
committed by Rawls. Through his selection of idealizations, he perpetuates an ideology that 
serves to reinforce a set of privileges afforded to “bourgeois white males” operating in the highest 
echelons of professional philosophy.12 On the other hand, Geuss is criticizing Rawls for providing 
a theory that does the opposite of which it is purportedly constructed to accomplish. Since Rawls 
starts with unexamined moral intuitions, Rawls is merely perpetuating the ideology that has 
shaped those intuitions. It may be noted that although Mills and Geuss appear to be critiquing 
Rawls on his ideological effects, they object to it for different reasons. Mills is objecting on moral 
grounds. Rawls’ contribution is morally wrong because of its role in perpetuating injustice. 
Geuss’ objection is rooted in Rawls’ misunderstanding of political philosophy. Political 
theorizing should be separate from moral theorizing. Geuss is a strong realist; this means he 
believes politics is a completely autonomous human activity which requires theorizing that is 
equally autonomous. Rawls is performing the role of reconciling American society to their 
already held beliefs rather than producing a theory of politics.13 
 
C. Section 2: Reflective Equilibrium 
                                               
11 The point I am stressing here is that one need not agree with the belief that this is an actual overlap in 
critiques by Mills and Geuss in order to find a hybrid approach useful. For instance, a moralist political 
philosopher may find that the adoption and utilization of this hybrid approach justifiable based solely on 
their morality with no regard for any deeply held realists views. The hybrid theory may simply be more 
effective at realizing morally desirable ends in the political sphere, and, therefore, it should be adopted on 
those grounds. 
12 Mills, Charles W. (Charles Wade). ""Ideal Theory" as Ideology." p. 172 
13 Geuss, Raymond. Philosophy and Real Politics. p. 89 
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Reflective equilibrium is the conclusion of a deliberative process wherein which as 
theoretical principles develop they are continually checked against standing “commitments”14. 
Rawls appeals to this form of reasoning while developing justice as fairness. Rawls described 
reflective equilibrium in the following manner, 
People have considered judgments [about morality] at all levels of generality, from those 
about particular situations and institutions up through broad standards and first 
principles to formal abstract conditions on moral conceptions. One tries to see how 
people would fit their various convictions into one coherent scheme, each considered 
judgment whatever its level having a certain initial credibility. By dropping and revising 
some, by reformulating and expanding others, one supposes that a systematic 
organization can be found. Although in order to get started various judgments are 
viewed as firm enough to be taken provisionally as fixed points, there are no judgments 
on any level of generality that are in principle immune to revision.15 
The conclusion of this process renders a theory that is consistent with our intuitions and 
judgments about a certain subject. But this process is not merely useful to moral theorists but 
rather all theorists. It is a feature of good reasoning; a theory that is consistent with what the 
theorist believes appears to be exactly what theorists strive to develop.16 It is because of this 
                                               
14 Commitments can both be pre-deliberative stances and instantiated by a particular propositional 
judgment with a certain degree of “weight”. For instance, I can have a moral commitment to fair and equal 
treatment regardless of any substantive theory explaining exactly what I mean by this. On the other hand, 
my commitments can also be born out by propositional judgments which I would select for entry into RE. 
For example, “A society must treat citizens equally and fairly” or “No arbitrary characteristic should affect 
a citizen's access to opportunity”. These judgments can also be evaluative. “Society S does not treat all of 
their citizens fairly”; my commitment is then represented by this judgment and the degree of importance I 
assign to it. I demonstrate my commitment by granting greater “weight” to the judgment which will be used 
in the deliberative process. 
15 Kelly, Thomas, and Sarah McGrath. "is Reflective Equilibrium enough?" Philosophical Perspectives, 
vol. 24, no. 1, 2010, pp. 325-359, doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00195.x. 
16 “Rawls, in contrast, presents and employs reflective equilibrium as his mode of justification without any 
explicit questioning of the theoretical status of this mode, and it seems that the problem of justification at 
this point in Rawls’s moral theory is perceived by himself as well as most of his readers and commentators 
to be fairly straightforwardly resoluble and unproblematic.” Eng, Svein. "Why Reflective Equilibrium? I: 
Reflexivity of Justification." Ratio Juris, vol. 27, no. 1, 2014, pp. 138-154, doi:10.1111/raju.12035. 
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broad appeal that I will appropriate the reflective equilibrium framework to discuss, in section 3, 
where the distinctions lie between various forms of political theory.17 
I will provide a brief outline of reflective equilibrium as I will be using it throughout the 
rest of the paper. First, I will outline what goes into reflective equilibrium. Then, I will describe 
the internal dynamics of reflective equilibrium, and, finally, I will explain the outcome of the 
deliberative process. Although this framework is fairly abstract, I believe the clarity it provides in 
the proceeding section justifies its utilization. 
What gets plugged in reflective equilibrium can vary. Intuitions, observations, pre-
existing principles and even complete theories can be plugged into the deliberative process of 
reflective equilibrium.18 If reflective equilibrium is simply the way we reason, then it seems 
rather trite to say that we can plug anything into this deliberative process. The selection procedure 
for inputs is what is actually being debated among theorists; for instance, when developing a 
theory about politics, the judgement about whether a local football team will win the 
championship is unimportant; if a theorist decides to enter this irrelevant information, other 
theorist may judge them as incompetent or non-serious. The selection procedure decides what 
gets selected for entry into the deliberative process; and this means that the selection process is 
pre-theoretical and not determined by the eventual theory. It is how we as reasonable theorists 
select the relevant information and ignore the noise. The selection procedure not only determines 
which individual judgments are added to the deliberative process, it also determines the source 
from which these judgments come. A moral theorist will select judgments from a moral source; 
                                               
17 I want to make clear that Rawls uses reflective equilibrium as both an explanatory and justificatory 
mechanism. It can explain how we come to well-developed principles, and it also provides justification for 
those principles (because those principles cohere with our commitments). In this paper, I am only 
concerned with the explanatory aspect of RE. I am interested in its ability to characterize the theorizing 
process; whether RE provides further justification for a realist nonideal theory is outside the scope of this 
paper. 
18 I would like to make clear that these intuitions, observations, pre-existing principles, theories and 
judgements are correlated to a pre-deliberative commitment. We cannot plug commitments into the process 
rather we can plug in judgments, intuitions, etc., which are representative of a particular commitment. 
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an economist will select judgments from an economic source. This correlation between theory 
type and judgment source is not exclusionary; in fact, it would be pertinent for a moral theorist to 
pull from psychology, or an economist from advanced mathematics. And so on. The selection 
procedure determines which inputs are pertinent to the theorizing process. Throughout section 3, I 
will be referring to these various elements as “inputs”. 
Different judgments will come with different levels of certainty and importance.19 When 
developing a theory concerning how one should act in traffic, the selected definition of “the 
good”, let’s say utilitarianism’s maximization of overall happiness principle, will have greater 
importance than, for instance, the agent offending someone. If it will maximize happiness for the 
agent to cut someone off in traffic, then the degree to which the person who was cut off is 
offended only matters if it reaches a threshold where the maximization principle is violated. In 
this example, we see the primacy of the judgment that “one should always act to maximize 
overall happiness”. This judgment is granted a certain degree of “weight” in the deliberative 
process. Imagine it this way: we plug the maximization principle into RE alongside the fact that 
certain actions produce unhappiness (i.e. cutting someone off in traffic). We assign an infinite 
amount of “weight” to the maximization principle and less weight to the fact concerning traffic 
etiquette.20 Then, we see reflective equilibrium render us a theory concerning the limited realm of 
cutting someone off in traffic, which informs us to cut the person off in traffic unless a very 
special case occurs. [We, then, proceed to justifiably cut the person off in traffic!] The degree to 
                                               
19 Kelly and McGrath refer to these inputs as ‘considered judgments’. They state, “considered judgments 
are judgments of which one is confident (as opposed to uncertain or hesitant), that are issued when one is 
able to concentrate without distraction on the question at hand (as opposed to when one is ‘upset or 
frightened’) and with respect to which one does not stand to gain or lose depending on how the question is 
answered. In addition, such judgments must be stable over time.” Kelly, Thomas, and Sarah McGrath. "Is 
Reflective Equilibrium enough?" p. 325-359 
20 It is important to note that the “infinite” weighting granted to the maximization principle in the traffic 
example is a special case. For the most part, there are very few, if any, inputs that will be granted an infinite 
weighting. Rawls would reject the maximization principle from entry into RE because it is not revisable. 
As opposed to the coherent justificatory structure envisioned by Rawls, the case of infinite weighting is a 
way to describe a foundationalist commitment. In the purely explanatory form of RE with which we are 
working, I believe this example is relatively uncontroversial.  
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which we are committed to our judgments determines the amount of weight we will grant the 
judgment while it is in the deliberative process of RE. So, in the remainder of the paper, the term 
“weight” will have this meaning. 
The concept of “weight” is important when we consider the fact that the process of 
reflective equilibrium consists in the mutual adjustment of judgments and principles until a 
resting state is reached. The metaphor of “gravity” is helpful here. For instance, our moon exerts 
gravity on the Earth as it revolves around it. Although the Earth is much larger and a greater 
source of gravity, the moon’s gravity acts as a stabilizer for the Earth’s rotation. Both bodies exert 
some degree of gravity on one another; both have an effect on one another. Our bodies, on the 
other hand, exert gravity on the Earth to a dramatically lesser degree. We fall immediately to the 
surface and have little to no effect on the rotation of the Earth.  
Regardless of the scientific accuracy of this example, the analogical point should be 
clear. There is a mutual pull judgments in reflective equilibrium will exert on one another. The 
judgments which are granted more weight will have a greater influence on those judgments with a 
lesser weight. A collection of inputted judgments where one is granted a much more significant 
weighting will force an adjustment to the other judgments. An adjustment to a judgment may 
force us to slightly amend it or destroy it. In evaluating Kepler’s geocentric model of the 
universe, Copernicus radically does away with the judgment that the Earth is the center of the 
universe. Kepler’s theory had grown cumbersome by needing to posit “equants” which save his 
view of planetary circular motion while maintaining an Earth-centered universe. Copernicus 
destroyed the need for the imaginary equants and offered a new theory that was able to save 
circular motion by positing a sun-centered universe. Clearly, in this case, Copernicus granted 
more weight to theoretical parsimony and circular motion as opposed to an Earth-centered model 
of the universe. The weight granted to a judgment prior to introduction to RE will dramatically 
impact the lesser weighted judgments as the deliberative process proceeds toward a state of 
reflective equilibrium. 
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For Rawls, justice is the primary moral intuition by which we should shape a theory 
about politics.21 He decides to plug our intuition about justice into reflective equilibrium 
alongside other inputs. Justice is a moral concept; in other words, the source of the intuition about 
justice exists outside of the deliberative process; whether justice be the product of a moral theory 
or a strongly held “feeling”, it comes to the deliberative process already with a degree of 
significance. His inputs to justice could be described in terms of granting “significant weight”. 
Alongside other commitments, Rawls begins the process of thinking through possible principles 
by which to describe the “ideally just society”. Since justice has a “significant weight” compared 
to other inputs, the other inputs will face more adjustment during the deliberative process. Justice 
as fairness is the end state of this deliberative process; once the process of mutual adjustment 
finishes, we have a finished theory.  
So, to clarify, reflective equilibrium can be broken into three stages. First, we have the 
selection procedure which selects the various inputs for entry into the deliberative process. The 
commitment to individual judgments are reflected by the weight that is assigned to them prior to 
introduction. Second, we have the mutual adjustment of various judgments and principles. 
Judgments which have a more significant weight affect less significant judgments to a greater 
degree. These judgments also exert force on the tentative principles as they develop. Third, and 
finally, the deliberative process reaches a state of reflective equilibrium. At this point, a theory 
has been reached, where the developed principles are consistent with the adjusted judgments. 
This theory is now ready to make prescriptions relevant to the theorist’s commitments. 
In the next section, I will use this framework to clarify the distinction between various 
types of political theory. For ideal theory, I will use this framework to re-explain the intuition 
critique. I will, then, offer a type of theory that I believe escapes the intuition critique. 
                                               
21Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. p. 4 
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Throughout that section, I will attempt to use both concrete examples as well as the language of 
reflective equilibrium. 
 
D. Section 3: Explaining Theoretical Approaches and Outcomes 
 
a. Ideal Theory 
 
[Moral Judgments] → {RE} → Ideal Theory 
 
Ideal theory seeks to clarify our depiction of the “ideally just society”. By providing the 
desirable end-state, political philosophy can begin the hard work of achieving this morally ideal 
state of affairs. Rawls is not the only ideal theorist. Nozick proposes an ideal political 
arrangement which consists in what he calls “the minimal state”.22 This nightwatchman depiction 
of the ideal state limits government to a mere protector of the rights of citizens. Taxation, the 
forcible collection of citizens’ capital, is only justified for these ends. Nussbaum proposes an 
ideal society where certain human capacities are allowed to flourish.23 Instead of providing 
particular proscriptions on governmental behavior, Nussbaum identifies key human capacities 
which should be fostered and protected by the government. All ideal theoretic approaches identify 
moral ideals and then seek to realize those ideals in the real world. The actual steps toward the 
ideal is relegated to another type of theory, to nonideal theory. 
 
Rawls: [Minimax/Fully Rational, Impartial/Veil of Ignorance, Distribution of 
Resources/Justice, etc.] → {RE} → Justice as Fairness 
                                               
22Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books, New York, 1974. 
23Nussbaum, Martha C., 1947. Sex & Social Justice. Oxford University Press, New York, 1999. p. 41. 
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This diagram shows that as a result of the inputs of the moral judgments selected by 
Rawls for introduction to RE, justice as fairness is produced. This is a rather trivial claim 
considering that Rawls claims this himself.24 It is a result of RE that Rawls comes to justice as 
fairness. But a problem often leveled against Rawls (and other ideal theorists) is that the theory 
produced is not political rather moral. The product of this deliberative process has provided us a 
clarification on what our moral intuitions say about justice rather than a directly actionable 
political theory. The Rawlsian response to this charge often takes the form of claiming that the 
critic is misunderstanding Rawls’ intent. His aim is to provide a picture of the ideally just society 
so we can begin to work toward it. It is the moral ideal which we must make the real world 
reflect. The framework of reflective equilibrium also clarifies the intuition critique. 
 
● Reflective Equilibrium and the Intuition Critique 
Now, I will explain the intuition critique [discussed at length in section 1] in these new 
terms. Ideal theory seeks to clarify our moral intuitions and provide a picture of the ideally just 
society. The critique is effectively ‘Ideal theory maintenances the status quo and, therefore, 
should be rejected.’ But what does this mean in the context of inputs and reflective equilibrium? 
The realist critique, as discussed in section 1, broadly charges Rawls with two things. 
First, his use of moral intuitions in developing a theory about politics is flawed. Second, the 
major flaw is that the propagation of this theory has the effect of maintaining the ‘status quo’. So, 
I will address each part of the critique as ‘the use of intuitions’ and ‘the maintenance of the status 
quo’, respectively. It is in the first stage of the process of reflective equilibrium, the selection and 
introduction of initial judgments, where the intuition critique is most charitably attacking the use 
                                               
24Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. p. 18 
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of moral intuitions. The charge of status quo maintenance is aimed at the finished product; the 
result of the mutual adjustment judgments and principles, which is justice as fairness. 
The use of intuitions is not necessarily a problem. The intuition critique charges Rawls 
with blindly using inputs found only within the pre-theoretical pool of morality. Since Geuss is a 
critical theorist, there is no escaping the role success in politics has on our intuitions. This is often 
bluntly stated, “morality is dead politics.” I will grant this point to Geuss.25 Past political success 
by one group, for instance Enlightenment-era European men, has the effect of ingraining into the 
mind of the populace the “naturalness” of rights, the necessity of property and the primacy of the 
problem of distributive justice. The values and concerns of the politically successful group has 
the effect of rendering “natural” certain intuitions present in the minds of the populace. In this 
way, moral values are products of past political success, or “dead politics”.  
For the critic, Rawls has mistaken his intuitions about justice as free of ideological 
influence. Rawls mistakenly believes the veil of ignorance and the original position have allowed 
him to step outside of the influence that past political domination has had on the ‘naturalness’ of 
our moral intuitions and the way we reason about morality. Furthermore, since Rawls believes 
himself ideologically pure, his proliferation of this theory about justice, to him, only appears as 
stating a moral truth we all intuitively accept. Rawls, also, is blind to the fact that the very 
proliferation of a theory about justice is a political act, in itself. The theory which presents itself 
free of ideological impurities has the effect of affirming the prevailing ideology. This is 
accomplished by merely distracting away from the ideology’s role in shaping our intuitions and 
beliefs. For Geuss, this is where the maintenance of the status quo occurs. The use of moral 
intuitions without a recognition of how these intuitions are often formed is the primary flaw of 
                                               
25 For the purposes of this paper, I take the position that all moral disputes about politics are ideological. In 
the end, when I offer RNT as a viable alternative it is implicitly accepting that one’s morality as correlative 
to one’s ideological stance. In the end, a substantive RNT (one where a theorist inserts their own morality) 
is an ideological stance which is attempting to influence society in favor of the theorist’s ideology. A 
moralist political philosophy, which includes RNT, is an ideological tool. 
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Rawls’ methodology.26 His selection procedure includes, to his detriment, intuitions which are 
ideologically tainted. 
The maintenance of the status quo critique, which is found in Mills, is more generally a 
charge of blindness to other forms of injustice. This blindness has the effect of establishing the 
primacy of economic injustice and subverting the demands to address non-economic forms of 
injustice (e.g. gender injustice and racial injustice). “Rawls’s methodological decision to focus on 
“ideal theory” and a “well-ordered society” has been little help in addressing the problems of our 
non-ideal, ill-ordered, patriarchal and racist societies.”27  These other forms of injustice are mere 
deviations whereas economic injustice is the actual problem. The fact that economic injustice is 
primary to Rawls is a feature of his working in the Western tradition of political theorizing 
wherein the theorists are almost exclusively European men.28 Rawls idealizes away from certain 
features of society, which are far from just, in order to describe the primary problem (distributive 
justice); in effect, Rawls’ ideal theory is now operating as ideology. Ideal theory is serving the 
status quo. Again, we see the use of bad idealizations in the theorizing process as a primary flaw 
in Rawls’ theorizing. The (more radical) nonideal theorist is leveling a critique parallel to the 
realist critique of the use of intuitions. Both the realist and the nonideal theorist are addressing the 
inputs Rawls has selected for introduction to reflective equilibrium. The selection procedure used 
by Rawls is faulty. 
 
                                               
26 As far as moral intuitions are concerned, I do not think that we necessarily need to rid them from our 
theorizing about politics to avoid the intuition critique. If one were to simply accept that all of our moral 
intuitions are ideologically tainted, we can still select the most preferable among these intuitions. This 
move frames all moralist political philosophy as a form of ideological propaganda. If this option is selected, 
Rawls simply provides a bad version of propaganda; unaware of his role in this ideological debate, Rawls 
provides a counterproductive piece of propaganda by intending to provide a roadmap to the ideally just 
society he mistakenly moves us further away from the ideal. 
27 Pateman, Carole, and Mills, Charles W. (Charles Wade). Contract and Domination. Polity, Cambridge, 
2007. p. 5. 
28Mills, Charles W. "Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls." The Southern Journal of Philosophy 47.S1 (2009): 
161-84. p. 175. Print. 
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b. Nonideal Theory 
 
[Moral Judgments + Real World Facts] → {RE} → Nonideal Theory 
 
Nonideal theory is, in its original formulation, and is commonly believed to be, an 
appendage of ideal theory. The goal of nonideal theory is to bring the real world closer to the 
ideal. In particular, this means making broad theoretical claims into prescriptions applicable to 
particular situations. There is a balancing of the demands of morality with the inherently limited 
situation of the real world. This process is imperfect. There needs to be a theorist who does the 
hard work of identifying limitations the real world imposes on the attainment of the ideal. At that 
point, the nonideal theorist can begin to develop a theory that prescribes steps toward the ideal. 
This purely transitional view of nonideal theory will be the primary subject of this section. But 
nonideal theory is not limited to this purely transitional role. For instance, Mills (along with 
Pateman) offers a view of nonideal theory where the starting point of theorizing consists in 
recognizing the initial unjust state of affairs that have led to our current state of injustice; in 
essence, they offer a nonideal theory that starts from the nonideal world. Pateman and Mills, in 
their book Contract and Domination29, describe past societies as being founded on an implicit 
agreement among the dominant group to subvert the status of both women (Pateman’s the sexual 
contract) and racial minorities (Mills’ the racial contract). This initial agreement should be the 
starting point from which any theory concerning justice should start, not our moral ideal. 
 
Simmons: [justice as fairness + Partial Compliance judgments] → {RE} → Transitional 
Nonideal Theory  
 
                                               
29 Pateman, Carole, and Mills, Charles W. (Charles Wade). Contract and Domination. 
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Simmons view of nonideal theory (nonideal theory-as-transitional) is described in his 
article “Ideal and Nonideal Theory”30. In the article, he provides a clarification on what, he 
believes, Rawls is referring to when talking about nonideal theory. Nonideal theory, first, takes as 
its primary measure of injustice an ideal theory; in this case, obviously, the ideal theory of choice 
is Rawls’ justice as fairness. We measure a society based upon its conformity (or nonconformity) 
to the principles of justice. If a theory is in full conformity to the principles of justice, we can say 
that this theory is in a state of “full compliance” with justice as fairness; or, in other words, we 
can say that the basic structure of this society is just. If a society fails to be in conformity with the 
principles of justice, the society is in some form of “partial compliance”; nonideal theory’s 
purview is the realm of societies in a state of partial compliance.31 Partial compliance can be 
either deliberate or “unfortunate”; the first is intentional action by the state which prevents 
compliance, and the second is the inability of a society to achieve compliance due to historical, 
natural or economic factors. Simmons proceeds to divide the application of justice as fairness to 
various levels of society such as the basic structure, individuals and nations. For instance, 
noncompliance with the principles of justice could be deliberate: Simmons provides the example 
of institutional injustice. It could also be unfortunate, for example the society being extremely 
poor. We need not discuss these in further detail, but the point should be clear. Nonideal theory 
uses an ideal theory as a measure by which to assess the presence (or lack thereof) of justice and 
as a goal to which the real world should move toward. 
In our treatment of nonideal theory, we see that the inputs into reflective equilibrium are 
moral judgments and real world facts. For Simmons, nonideal theory is transitional. This means 
that any nonideal theorizing occurs after an ideal is conceptualized. This is captured by the 
diagram showing that Simmons would plug justice as fairness in its entirety into reflective 
                                               
30 Simmons, A. J. "Ideal and Nonideal Theory." Philosophy & Public Affairs 38.1 (2010): 5-36. ProQuest. 
Web. 26 Nov. 2015. 
31 In fact, Rawls uses “nonideal theory” interchangeably with “partial compliance theory”. Rawls, John. A 
Theory of Justice. p. 109 
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equilibrium alongside real world facts. [Justice as fairness is the product of a reflective 
equilibrium process; so, if it alone were to be plugged back into reflective equilibrium, there 
would be no adjustments. It is a finished product.] The addition of real world facts, which I have 
limited to simple partial compliance judgments, impacts our transitional nonideal theorist’s 
theorizing process. Based upon the features of this lack of compliance, the nonideal theorist 
would eventually reach a state of reflective equilibrium where prescriptions can be deduced. 
These prescriptions, which are tailored to the real world facts, would move the society in question 
closer toward the ideal. Now, we need not spend too much time fielding arguments as to the 
nature of the progression toward the ideal. For our purposes, the primary point is clear. Nonideal 
theory, in this common form, is the product of an ideal theory and real world facts which are 
plugged into reflective equilibrium and eventually settle into a state of reflective equilibrium. [It 
must be noted that this is merely a description of nonideal theorizing not a claim about what a 
nonideal theorist might claim they are doing.] 
 
● The Big Problem for Nonideal Theory 
The general problem with this form of nonideal theory is that it is rooted in ideal theory. 
In other words, since nonideal theory requires an ideal theory, which can be plugged into 
reflective equilibrium, the problems inherent in the ideal theory of choice are carried along with 
it. In Simmons’ case, we find that the problems of Rawlsian justice as fairness are Simmons’ 
problems as well. This could explain why rehabilitating justice as fairness takes on a sisyphean 
quality; the typical approach is simply to incorporate more real world facts alongside the already 
tainted theory. This intractability, in terms of reflective equilibrium, occurs due to the significant 
weighting of justice as fairness compared to the real world facts which are added to the already 
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stable system.32 But clearly due to nature of the intuition critique, no amount of additional real 
world facts will allow nonideal theory to escape that specific problem with ideal theory. 
 
● Nonideal Theory vs. Realism 
Before broaching the topic of realist theory, the use of a reflective equilibrium framework 
for discussing theoretical approaches provides a clarification of the distinction between nonideal 
theory and realism. Simply, the difference lies in the commitments which are considered and 
allowed to impact the theorizing process; in other words, where the nonideal theorist plugs in 
moral judgments alongside real world facts, the realist plugs in realist judgments (i.e. whose 
interests receive priority? or what are the legitimate forms of violence afforded to the political 
order?) alongside real world facts. A common misconception about the relationship between 
nonideal theory and realism is that they are essentially one and in the same; realism constitutes 
the most extreme version of the nonideal theorist’s demand for the incorporation of more real 
world facts.33 The view that realism sits on the spectrum of ideal and nonideal theory now appears 
to be obviously false. Despite the apparent correlation between the increase in the use of real 
world facts, the difference between ideal/nonideal theory and realist theory is the use of moral 
and realist commitments, respectively. These are two different conceptions of politics. In our 
language, the theorizing process draws from different commitment pools. The very nature of 
politics and political theorizing are perceived differently. Matt Sleat, a political realist, directly 
responds to this wrongheaded conflation, 
Realism is often presented as a variation of a non-ideal theme. This conflation is a 
mistake. Whereas the ideal/non-ideal theory debate consists of a series of methodological 
                                               
32 If we were to, for instance, increase the weight of our real world facts to the point where they are 
weighted significantly more than justice as fairness, we would no longer be doing transitional nonideal 
theory. 
33 Valentini makes this mistake. Valentini, Laura. "Ideal Vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map." 
Philosophy Compass 7.9 (2012): 654-64. Print. 
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issues that take place squarely within the liberal framework, and hence retains many (if 
not all) of its assumptions regarding the purpose of politics and the ambitions of political 
theory, realism is a competing theory of politics in its own right that presents a radical 
challenge to those liberal assumptions.34  
I believe this difference in conception need not render insights from these approaches de facto 
incommensurable. The approach that I will later propose respects the difference between “liberal 
political philosophy” and realism which Sleat is highlighting. A combination of realism and 
nonideal theory can avoid the intuition critique which is aimed at ideal theory while also 
incorporating morality. This idea will be addressed in-depth later. 
 
c. Strong Realism 
 
[Realist Judgments + Real World Facts] → {RE} → Realist Theory 
 
Strong realists, and to a lesser degree all realists, see politics as an autonomous realm of 
human activity. People’s interests will inevitably conflict with the interests of others. For Hobbes, 
the state of where everyone is at war with everyone else is the natural condition of mankind; 
Hobbes, as well as many political and moral theorists, refer to this as “the state of nature”. The 
various desires and goals of individuals, if pursued unchecked by a political order, would render 
the world a violent hellscape akin to AMC’s The Walking Dead. Hobbes suggests this is what 
grants the “sovereign” their right to rule over their subjects and their permission to use violence. 
Other theorists see the possibility of this horrific state of affairs as the impetus behind individuals 
rationally choosing to subvert some of their interests in favor of living free of this possibility; by 
                                               
34Sleat, Matt. "Realism, Liberalism and Non-Ideal Theory Or, are there Two Ways to do Realistic Political 
Theory?: Realism, Liberalism and Non-Ideal Theory." Political Studies (2014): n/a. p. 1. Print. 
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entering into a contract with others, the self-interest of all contractees is furthered. For the most 
part, to think that politics is founded on this implicit “contract” between all members of a society 
is to be a “contractualist”35. A political realist does not need to accept this proposition, but the 
preceding discussion does highlight a key feature of realism, the prevalence of conflict and its 
relationship to politics. What differentiates realism from other conceptions of politics is the role 
of conflict. Where ideal theorists see conflict as an ill to be cured by the attainment of the ideally 
just political arrangement, the realist sees conflict as the eternal basis for politics; politics without 
conflict is not politics at all rather an ethical utopia. 
Strong realism is the view that politics should be investigated and theorized about in such 
a way that grants politics the fullest autonomy from other human activities. In the case of conflict, 
a political order’s primary goal is to maintain conditions of cooperation which prevent conflicting 
interest from becoming too violent. But a political order is not a group of individuals who merely 
dominate their subjects; in order for a political order to be “political”, it must do so legitimately.36 
Political realism’s primary focus is “legitimate” domination; since without legitimacy, politics 
would be nonexistent. This focus on the notion of legitimacy in political theorising is contrasted 
against the ideal and nonideal theorist’s concern with “justice” (or other moral concerns). 
Political philosophy, then, should pay close attention to the unique qualities and nature of politics 
rather than attempting to assume moral theory is at the root of political theorizing. The chief 
example of strong realism is Raymond Geuss.  
 
Geuss: [Who Whom?, Priority, and Legitimation] → {RE} → Geussian Realist Theory 
 
                                               
35 Contractualism is distinct from Contractarianism which is a moral view that makes the claim that politics 
should be organized around the idea of an impartial contract between rational individuals. Actual or 
counterfactual assent to the domination grants legitimacy to the political order. 
36Sleat, Matt. "Legitimacy in Realist Thought: Between Moralism and Realpolitik." Political Theory, vol. 
42, no. 3, 2014, pp. 314-337, doi:10.1177/0090591714522250. 
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It is important to note that realism is heavily contextual. The general principles derived 
by ideal theorists are nothing like the conclusions of a realist. ‘We must look to the real world 
first!’ when describing politics. Political realism, or “the realist approach to political philosophy” 
as Geuss refers to it, can be summed up by asking three questions about a given society’s political 
order. First, “Who Whom?” is a question Geuss derives from Vladimir Lenin. The question, after 
Geuss makes two adjustments, develops into “Who could do what to whom for whose benefit?”. 
This is essentially a question of who has the power to force another to act. The second derives 
from Nietzsche’s discussion on human finitude and the structure of human valuation as 
differential. “Politics as we know it is a matter of differential choice: opting for A rather than B.” 
This question can be summed up as “Which option do we choose, whose preferences will be 
respected and when will this choice be implemented?” And, the third is derived from Max Weber. 
“Weber’s idea…[was] that there was generalised human order that claimed and had some kind of 
legitimacy, and part of that legitimacy was, in one or another of a variety of complex and indirect 
ways, transmitted down to the acts of violence that were perpetrated as a normal part of social 
interaction.” This point is complex, but it can be summarized as follows: In any given society, 
there are various values and beliefs that grant permission for violence (or force) to be used in 
certain instances. These values and beliefs can be thought of as a “legitimatory mechanism”.This 
question can be articulated as, “What are the legitimatory mechanisms in the given society?”. 
These three questions constitute what Geuss calls “a realist approach to political philosophy”.37 
The question still remains “what exactly are we plugging in to reflective equilibrium?” The 
Geussian approach consists of answering questions about the political arrangement of a society, 
and the answers to those questions are what we are plugging into reflective equilibrium. The 
synthesis of realist concepts with the real world facts highlights the contextuality of this approach 
to political philosophy. 
                                               
37 Geuss, Raymond. Philosophy and Real Politics.  
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● “But what about our moral concerns?” 
The problem with this theory is paradoxically one of morality. It must be clearly stated 
that a realist like Geuss would dismiss this problem out of hand. The question is ideologically 
motivated as opposed to voicing a serious theoretical concern with realism. Morality is a feature 
of agents within a political society, but it does not have sway over the fundamental nature of 
politics. There are numerous critiques against such a hardline position, but I am not interested in 
those. The critique here is simply a dissatisfaction with the complete separation of moral theory 
and political philosophy; this is a sentiment I share. The extreme nature of Geuss’ approach 
provides an excellent contrast to the approach I will be taking in the following section.  
 
d. Weak Realism and Realist Nonideal Theory 
 
[Realist Judgments + Moral Judgments + Real World Facts] → {RE} → Weak Realist 
Theory 
 
Weak Realism is not a novel approach to political philosophy; it is not unique to attempt 
to blend concerns about legitimate political behavior with moral ideals. It has appeared 
throughout history in various forms. Characteristically, realism has been a critique of Platonic and 
utopian approaches to political philosophy; realism reigns in political philosophy when political 
theorists go beyond their purview. The production of a weak realist political theory is nothing 
more than an attempt to say “at the very least, politics is somewhat unique, somewhat 
autonomous and morality has some say in politics”. The chief defender of this approach, in the 
most recent iteration of this debate, is Bernard Williams. As opposed to Geuss, weak realists 
concede the force of the question posed to strong realism, “what about our moral concerns?” In 
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particular, what about are politically focused moral intuitions? Is Justice not important? Do 
Fairness and Equality have no sway on the way we theorize? Are we merely ideologues when we 
push for a more open and just society? 
Realist nonideal theory is a version of weak realism. The impetus behind providing realist 
nonideal theory is a moral one. I hope that this iteration of weak realism will contribute to the 
reduction of injustice. The impetus toward the reduction of injustice would be unsubstantiated in 
a strong realist framework; in fact, the very notion of injustice would be nonexistence therein. 
Although a substantive account of realist nonideal theory is, as of yet, not fully articulable, I 
believe the general characterization of what this theory is attempting to accomplish can be 
demonstrated using the mechanism of reflective equilibrium. Essentially, realist nonideal theory 
will consist of inputting realist and moral judgments along with real world facts into reflective 
equilibrium. The state of reflective equilibrium that is reached will be our realist nonideal theory. 
But, admittedly, this is a project in its infancy. What I will do, however, is begin to show the type 
of judgments a realist nonideal theory would utilize and how an approach of this nature avoids the 
problems found in the other types of theorizing.  
It must also be noted that RNT is a theory similar to other forms of realism that requires 
contextualization. For example, if a society’s political order has a broader range of legitimate use 
of force, the forced integration of two groups could be recommended; if the political order lacks 
this broader permission, then forced integration would lack theoretical justification and be 
proscribed. Real world facts are of paramount importance, since political theorizing is a non-
generalizable activity: the theory developed for one society would be different than that 
developed for another. The broad generalizations found in ideal theory are a feature carried over 
from moral theorizing which seeks to provide rules applicable to everyone; politics is not 
consistent from one society to the next. 
RNT would provide prescriptions to morally concerned political agents. Since both moral 
and political judgments are being utilized in the theoretical process, the type of prescriptions 
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produced would be, for example, of the nature of balancing between justice and legitimacy. For 
instance, the principle I will call “the rule of maintaining legitimacy” states, “In society S, a 
moral agent who is concerned with reducing injustice in an institution must avoid actions which 
undermine the legitimacy of S’s political order.” This principle proscribes any justice-seeking 
activity that threatens the legitimacy of the political order. But this principle appears to be 
instructing morally concerned political agents to accept the status quo in fear of undermining its 
legitimacy. This principle taken by itself may in fact require that; so we will add an additional 
judgment. Let’s call it “measurement of legitimacy”, “A society’s political order O is legitimate 
as long as injustice is not present.” This principle makes a bold claim that a society is not 
legitimate if there is currently injustice present. This is a strong claim; this principle by itself 
would render legitimate political domination a rarity, if not an outright impossibility. We can 
amend this with a further definition of legitimacy, “Legitimacy of a society’s political order is a 
question of degree; a political order is legitimate as long as it is within an acceptable range of 
unjust outcomes for some classes of citizens within the society.” If we define legitimacy as a 
range of acceptable injustice, the conversation shifts from whether a political order is outright 
legitimate to “what outcomes are judged as ‘unjust’?”, “what constitutes ‘acceptability’ when it 
comes to unjust outcomes?” and “what ‘classes of citizens’ should face these unjust outcomes, 
and how are these ‘classes’ determined?”. These questions along with many others open the door 
for a morally concerned theorist to insert their own moral definitions. We would proceed to select 
additional judgments of a similar nature until we are satisfied; if after a round of adjustment our 
principles are inconsistent with our commitments, we scrap the problematic ones, add new ones 
or attempt to further amend them until we reach a state of reflective equilibrium. 
The example principles offered above need not constituted the eventual principles which 
are settled on in a state of reflective equilibrium, but the nature of the principles highlight where 
there is a blending of moral and realist judgments. Concerns about justice and legitimacy are tied 
together in order to render principles which respect realist concerns for a stable, well-ordered and 
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legitimate political order while also respecting the desire to shape politics in accordance with 
moral concerns about just treatment of citizens. A full development and defense of RNT will not 
be attempted in this shorter format, but I will show how, at the very least, RNT avoids the 
intuition critique which plagues ideal and nonideal theorists as well as allowing morality to have 
a say in politics. 
 
● How do the moral and realist judgments interact during the deliberative process for RNT? 
Before showing how RNT avoids the intuition critique, the selection procedure at play 
must be clarified. Weak Realism, generally, selects judgments from morality, realism and real 
world facts to input into reflective equilibrium. Realist judgments (as well as moral judgments) 
are empty and meaningless until real world facts are considered. For example, questions 
concerning the legitimacy of a society’s political order requires direct observation of the 
governed populace and the behavior of their governing body; claims of unjust behavior require 
observations of the real world regardless of how “justice” is defined. Since realism is contextual, 
real world facts provide the context by which realist commitments gain substantiality as realist 
judgments; otherwise, we have empty references to unspecified realist commitments. So, now we 
are left with moral judgments and the contextualized realist judgments, which are equally 
weighted.  
“Equal weighting” is only meant to prevent situations wherein which moral inputs (as a 
whole) are weighted higher than realist inputs (as a whole); here, we are looking to prevent the 
weighting one may assign to a source of an input rather than the inputs on an individual basis. 
The tying of weight between commitments of different ilks (specifically, moral and realist 
commitments) is the fundamental contribution of RNT. It is not simply the collective dumping of 
moral and realist judgments into reflective equilibrium and seeing what comes out the other end. 
It is the introduction of singular judgments which consist of both moral and realist counterparts. 
We are tying moral and realist concerns together in order to produce a new type of political 
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theory. So, for further clarification, RNT grants equal weight and attention to moral and realist 
commitments and then enters their correlated inputs as a single input into the deliberative 
process.38 These hybrid judgments are not the same as purely moral or realist judgments and do 
not operate in the same manner. This leads us to the essential question, “how does RNT avoid the 
intuition critique?”.  
RNT avoids the intuition critique is by limiting the influence of these moral intuitions. 
One could bite the bullet and say “of course, all moralizing in political theory is ideological”. But 
this is a descriptive fact. We could grant this fact about what is occurring when moralizing about 
politics and still see value in bringing our morality to political theorizing. If this move is taken, all 
political theorizing which incorporates morality is ideological to a certain degree. RNT, I argue, 
is less ideological than other approaches due to its selection procedure. 
First, recall that Rawls is subject to the critique because he relied on moral intuitions; 
these intuitions were influenced by the prevailing ideology. Through the process of mutual 
adjustment, these tainted intuitions have the effect of influencing other inputs to the point where it 
is unclear exactly to what extent the ideology has permeated the resultant theory. Thus, the 
proliferation of this theory has the effect of promoting the prevailing ideology; in the end, 
promoting an ideology that is counterproductive to the goal of promoting justice. If a theory were 
to limit the role of intuitions (from the status of a singular input to the role of part of an input), the 
theory would less ideological. For example, say we were to incorporate an ideologically tainted 
intuition into an RNT judgment. A concern is raised about the ideological influence on that 
intuition. In order to ameliorate this problem, we need only to get rid of the tainted judgment. 
Conversely, for a Rawlsian to remove the intuition of justice from the deliberative process, is to 
fundamentally undermine the Rawlsian project. I argue that RNT is more revisable in the face of 
                                               
38 Since this characterization of RNT is still fairly abstract, the selection procedure will not limit which 
counterparts will be selected by a theorist beyond the mere selecting and combining of a moral and realist 
input. 
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undesirable ideological influence because the influence of moral intuitions is more limited than 
other approaches.  
Let us further discuss RNT’s “coupling” procedure. RNT selects for introduction into RE 
a moral pre-input and a realist pre-input.39 The moral component can be an intuition, for example, 
about “equality”. We hold an amorphous understanding about what we mean by “equality”, but 
we are fully capable of identifying instances where equality is lacking. We need not have a fully 
developed definition or theoretical framework in order to account for this intuition. The full scope 
of inputs produced by the morality commitment pool is not reducible to intuitions, but, in our case 
in particular, we are specifically concerned with the incorporation of moral intuitions. The realist 
component can be a range of different judgments. For instance, concerns about legitimacy require 
real world facts in order for these judgments to be meaningful. Legitimacy, for many realists, is 
an empirical question; “What are the legitimation beliefs present in the society?”, “What is an 
acceptable deviation in the behavior of a society’s political order from that society’s legitimation 
beliefs?”, “Is the political order of the society acting in accordance with those legitimation 
beliefs?”, etc. These two components are combined as a single input with its own unique 
weighting. Since this is an input which merely contains an intuition as opposed to being an 
intuition, the intuition which is contained within the couplet has a different role in the deliberative 
process.  
Whereas Rawls’ use of moral intuitions allow intuitions as singular inputs to influence 
directly the principles which develop throughout the deliberative process, RNT limits moral 
intuitions to a definitional role. RNT’s couplet judgments are defined by both the moral intuition 
and the realist judgment. Let us recall one of the example principles of RNT, “In society S, a 
moral agent who is concerned with reducing injustice in an institution must avoid actions which 
undermine the legitimacy of S’s political order.” Here “justice”, or rather “injustice”, is the moral 
                                               
39 A “pre-input” is merely a candidate for RNT’s selection procedure. As opposed to inputs, these pre-
inputs are members of a single input entered into RE after their coupling with another pre-input. 
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intuition at play. “What does justice or injustice mean?” If an ideologically tainted moral intuition 
is unknowingly selected, then we would revise the judgments wherein which that intuition is 
found. In this case, we are able to identify the problematic inputs and revise our judgments 
accordingly. Undesirable ideological influences will depend on the moral commitment of the 
theorist. So, essentially, the RNT couplet does not use intuitions as singular inputs rather as 
defining features of a judgement. This diminished status prevents the selected moral intuitions 
from ideologically tainting our final theory to the degree found in ideal theory. 
Although “coupling” saves RNT from the intuition critique, a further question arises, 
“Why doesn’t the use of ideologically tainted moral intuitions as members of RNT’s couplets 
promote injustice?” This is a fair question. The Millsian ideology critique still looms large; we 
could still be promoting an unjust ideology. But this is a problem with the pre-deliberative moral 
intuitions not the selection procedure of RNT; by this, I mean to shift responsibility to a 
reasonable, morally-concerned theorist. It is upon the theorist who will select, according to their 
best judgment, which moral intuitions are safe to use.40 This debate is situated in moral theory 
rather than political theory. RNT focuses only on selecting, conjoining and entering into RE 
moral and realist judgments. The discerning theorist must make the important determinations 
when it comes to which moral ends a fully substantiated RNT will seek to achieve. 
Another question, “Why can’t other theories simply borrow this selection procedure in 
order to reap the apparent benefits of RNT?” The reason this is not a viable option is due to a 
previous claim made in this paper. Political theorists are merely disputing over different selection 
procedures. If this is true, which I believe to be non controversial, then for an ideal theorist or a 
nonideal theorist to adopt a similar selection procedure to that of RNT would be a shift in 
theoretical approach. An ideal theorist would be doing realist nonideal theory rather than ideal 
theory. A nonideal theorist would be doing realist nonideal theory instead of nonideal theory. If 
                                               
40 The fact that RNT is more revisable is another plus if a situation were to arise when a previously “safe” 
intuition becomes “unacceptable”. 
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the selection procedure of RNT were to be adopted by any morally concerned political theorist, 
which I recommend, they would be doing realist nonideal theory. 
In ordinary language, using moral intuitions runs the risk of utilizing ideologically tainted 
intuitions; Rawls’ intuitions are victims of this negative influence. Due to the fact that he relies on 
these intuitions, justice as fairness is ideologically tainted. Realist nonideal theory combines 
moral and realist judgments. Moral intuitions are included when developing a RNT, but these 
moral intuitions are relegated to a definitional role as opposed to being granted the ability to 
directly shape principles. The influence of these moral intuitions is lessened and more revisable in 
light of a discovery of unacceptable ideological influence. Whenever “justice” is discussed within 
RNT, it is coupled with a realist concept (e.g. legitimacy); a moral intuition does not have an 
existence separate from a realist concept within RNT. In the same way, we cannot talk about 
“legitimacy” without stipulating the demands of “justice”; they are inextricably linked as a 
feature of RNT’s selection procedure. The judgments (which are entered into RE), principles 
(which are a result of an adjustment period within RE) and the prescriptions of the completed 
theory all have a bipartite existence; they always will make reference to both realist and moral 
concepts, concerns and interests. 
 
● “Why a realist nonideal theory?” 
Let us shift the language away from reflective equilibrium into ordinary language. Realist 
nonideal theory is a theoretical approach which attempts to tie realist and moral concepts 
together. The fundamental appeal of this approach rests upon the apparent relationship between 
realists’ demands for legitimacy and stability of a society's political order, and nonideal theorists’ 
desire to reduce injustice. When a societal institution is behaving unjustly, it can often be 
condemned on realist grounds as instability causing or violating the conditions of cooperation. 
There appears to be a causal relationship between events realist would characterize as violating 
the normative requirements of a political order and events nonideal theorists would describe as 
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unjust. This overlap is the impetus for pursuing a theoretical framework where insights from both 
groups can be incorporated and utilized. This approach is more effective than standard 
approaches, and, most importantly, is real-world focused, and allows morality to have a say in 
politics. Nonideal theorists, who find standard approaches unacceptable, have an alternative 
theoretical approach available. 
 
E. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, I explained the intuition critique that Geuss levels against Rawlsian ideal 
theory. The use of moral intuitions in the theorizing process smuggles in ideological influences. I 
define reflective equilibrium; the approach Rawls uses in developing justice as fairness. I 
appropriate this framework by further outlining this deliberative process, and, then, I use it to 
explain various forms of political philosophy. By pointing to the various types of inputs selected 
for introduction to the deliberative process of reflective equilibrium, we can distinguish between 
ideal theory, nonideal theory, strong realism and weak realism. In the end, I recommend a form of 
weak realism; realist nonideal theory combines moral and realist concepts. The intuition critique 
forces political theorists to adopt strong realism, or to accept the ideological function that 
morality plays in political theorizing. RNT concedes to the intuition critique and accepts the latter 
option by offering an approach that is less ideological: realist and moral judgments are combined 
and weighted equally, the introduced couplets are judgments which contain intuitions. These 
intuitions help define the larger RNT judgment but are not directly used in the deliberative 
process; these intuitions are limited to a definitional role. In this way, the intuition critique misses 
RNT, and because it accepts its ideological role while being more revisable in light of undesirable 
ideological influences. 
 
 
